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I am much indebted to Franz Knappik and Robert Stern for their generous 
attention to my work and their thoughtful arguments.1 I have learned a great deal 
from this and many other exchanges with both of them, and I am happy to have this 
opportunity to acknowledge the debt. In my response, I don’t want to let the 
generous spirit of what they write distract us from the considerable force of their 
worries—or from the considerable appeal of their counter-proposals. So I will here 
focus on these worries and proposals, trying to explain why I will—at least for now—
mostly stick with the position I defend in Reason in the World.  
Stern and the Fundamentality of the Metaphysics of Reason  
I begin with Stern, as he focuses more towards the beginning of my extended 
argument, on what he calls “conceptual realism” (similar to what I call Hegel’s 
“concept thesis”). Stern seems convinced that I have uncovered in Hegel a line of 
argument that he had not considered. Still, Stern argues as follows: Hegel does not 
so exclusively privilege the “metaphysics of reason” argument, in the manner I 
describe; Hegel also equally rests on, and needs, the argument Stern had in mind—
an argument from Kant’s epistemological problem about the explanation of the 
possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. So Stern is proposing a kind of hybrid, 
which I would call the “double-barreled Hegel”. And why not? After all, how could 
two kinds of arguments fail to be better than one? I think the idea is compelling, and 
future consideration may well turn up more advantages than I anticipate; debate 
about Hegel would be the better for it. But I still prefer my view in the book.  
I begin with a general point: Hegel is engaged in a systematic project, in 
which everything is meant to be unified. So I would initially distrust any proposed 
final explanation that Hegel’s case rests equally on this X and also that discrete Y. Of 
                                          
1 I also want to thank Tobias Rosefeldt for hosting the book symposium at which these papers 
were presented, at the Lehrstuhl für Klassische Deutsche Philosophie of the Humboldt University.  
course, many “and also” claims will be true of Hegel. But I think that the interpretive 
task includes explaining how the diversity of any “and also” is supposed to arise from 
some unifying focus. 
I am not here saying that Hegel’s Logic cannot address both metaphysics and 
epistemology. The point of my introducing these metaphilosophical considerations is 
to bring into view Hegel’s way of taking one kind of issue as fundamental, but 
without this excluding everything else. Instead of excluding, Hegel transforms 
everything else in light of his unifying or organizing focus. On my account, Hegel’s 
one unifying focus does bring considerable philosophical strength to his project. So 
while it may be true that two kinds of arguments can be better than one, I also think 
that a smaller set of arguments more tightly organized into a system, by taking one 
kind of issue as fundamental, can complete.  
One could cede that Hegel has such a unifying focus and then argue, contra 
my position, that this focus is on problems drawn from Kant’s positive project, as for 
example in the “Transcendental Analytic” of the first Critique, concerning the 
conditions of the possibility of experience, cognition, judgment, synthetic a priori 
knowledge, or something similar—concerning broadly epistemological issues, in this 
sense. I would then think that the strongest path would be to argue not that Hegel 
excludes metaphysics, ontology, etc., but that Hegel transforms all these in light of 
issues he takes as more basic, from Kant’s Analytic.2 If Stern sees Hegel as resting 
so much independent weight on Kant’s problem about the possibility of synthetic a 
priori knowledge, then I think that his reading will be pulled in this direction.  
But while that strategy has its strengths, I argue that we can preserve them 
and improve the reading further once we notice that, in Hegel’s Logic, a very 
different organizing focus provides the systematic unity. Hegel makes rather the 
metaphysics of reason fundamental, while everything else—such as the 
epistemological issues pursued in Kant’s Analytic—is so transformed thereby that all 
else can now only be understood by beginning with the metaphysics of reason, and 
not in any independent terms (such as terms from the letter to Herz, mentioned by 
Stern). Epistemology is not excluded, but it is radically transformed.  
What happens if we begin instead with a proposal, like Stern’s, that Hegel 
rests the metaphysics of the concept partly on the sort of epistemological problem 
                                          
2 I think this is the groundbreaking strategy of Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism, although the terms are 
used differently there. For example, Hegel transforms ontology rather than abandoning it, in radicalizing 
the sense in which conditions of the possibility of experience would be conditions of the possibility of 
objects themselves (Kant A158/B197; Pippin 1989, 33 and 2014, 148).  
that Kant means to resolve in his positive project? I think we meet difficulties. I 
would formulate the Kantian argument of concern to Stern as beginning with a step 
like this:  
(i) There is a pressing and inescapable problem for philosophy, hitherto 
unresolved, about the explanation of the possibility of synthetic a priori 
knowledge.  
Our receptivity can’t explain a priori knowledge, and views like pre-established 
harmony are an unacceptable deus ex machina. So Kant sees transcendental 
idealism as supported: it is needed to solve an inescapable problem. Stern reads 
Hegel borrowing the engine of Kant’s argument, (i), while adding that Kant’s 
proposal fails to solve the problem; so it is really Hegel’s conceptual realism that is 
supported:  
…if we think of the world itself as conceptually structured, then we can 
explain how mind and world function together, but without appeal to 
this ‘deus ex machina’… (6) 
But I don’t see a solution here. What Kant asks, in the letter to Herz, is this: “What 
is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the 
object?” (Ak. 10:130) Stern seems to me to have a harmony that just is. This seems 
like taking just the pre-established harmony and subtracting the pre-establishment, 
or taking just the deus ex machina, and subtracting the deus. I don’t see how just 
subtracting the ground leaves any answer to Kant’s question about what the ground 
is, let alone a better answer.   
Granted, Stern sees in Hegel a rejoinder to my complaint, in the wonderful 
passage in which Hegel says that some ways of defending the critical philosophy are 
akin to an argument that we should learn to swim before ever getting in the water. 
Stern says, of our cognitive capacities:  
…if we have some reason to think those capacities are problematic (as 
Kant does in his letter to Herz), then we should question them; but 
Hegel’s conceptual realism is meant to dispel such worries, and to make 
our knowledge here unmysterious. (6) 
I think this passage in Hegel is important. But it seems to me to leave the 
epistemological argument Stern sees, for conceptual realism, without force. This 
dispels the engine of Stern’s argument, (i). I don’t think that we can dismiss 
contenders, whether Kantian or pre-established harmony, on grounds that they fail 
to solve an inescapable philosophical problem, but then when it comes time to solve 
that problem, instead claim that it can be escaped. Fans of orthodox Kantianism will 
claim to do equally well in dispelling the questions about further grounds that Stern 
thinks they fail to answer. And the same with fans of pre-established harmony. Stern 
could instead complain that these competitors introduce more constructive 
philosophy than is needed, given the availability of the dispelling move. But then 
others will say the same of Stern: we don’t need the controversial metaphysics of 
conceptual realism because (they will say) we can immediately dispel Kant’s problem 
and appeal to supposedly unmysteriousness of our ordinary knowledge.  
I don’t think this is a special problem for Stern; I think quite generally that 
reading Hegel as resting weight on this kind of epistemological problem will meet 
similar results: such a Hegel will have to raise the stakes of epistemological problems 
so high, to eliminate competitors, that he cannot compellingly resolve those 
problems. This interpretive route ends with attributing to Hegel an uncompelling 
resolution to problems he is supposed to have selected as central. Or else with a 
portrayal of Hegel as converting to quietist pragmatism just in time to dismiss the 
theoretical problems that drove his arguments against others—quietist pragmatism 
ex machina.  
My starting point is instead the idea that Hegel seeks a philosophical system 
in an ambitious sense, so that his success would require orientation around some 
kind of basic problem that will not later get dispelled, but can be followed through, 
systematically, to the very end. So I think that Hegel’s swimming passage—in 
dispelling the problems central to Kant’s positive project, the Analytic, and the letter 
to Herz—is making a more radical point: namely, that this kind of epistemological 
problem is not at all what should play the role of the engine driving a truly 
systematic philosophy—or anything on which the metaphysics of the concept could 
or should rest. This is not to say that Hegel’s project is anything like the dispelling of 
problems in favor of returning to a surface of supposed quiet or unmysterious 
commonsense. Quite the opposite: the point is to move the dispelled problems out of 
the way, revealing a different kind of problem as more fundamental: the problem of 
the completeness of reason, or the problem of “the idea”—drawn not from Kant’s 
positive project, as in the Transcendental Analytic, but from Kant’s critique of the 
metaphysics of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic. And that is the problem to be 
carried through, systematically, to the end.  
Now Stern also worries that the resulting argument, as I explain it, cannot 
support conclusions that are ambitious enough, with respect to necessity and 
contingency, to be accurate to Hegel. There isn’t enough space to consider all 
versions of this worry, but here is one possible argument in the neighborhood, 
employing some quotations from Stern (p. 14); this would be deadly, if successful, 
but I would reject both premises:  
(1) The method of Kreines’ Hegel is supposed to be “inference to the 
best explanation”, which Hegel also sees at work in natural scientific 
claims about “laws, kinds and other immanent universals”.  
(2) Inference to the best explanation only supports conclusions that are 
“modest”, in the sense that “it just seeks for explanations for how 
things are round here”, in “our world”.  
(3) Thus, Kreines’ Hegel can only support conclusions about “our world”, 
which are too modest to be Hegel’s own conclusions.   
Start with the second premise, and consider the example, important in the 
book, of the rotation of the planets. The idea is that the natural sciences can infer 
from observations of this to the best explanation, drawing conclusions about the 
forces inherent in the nature or immanent concept of matter. If so, then this tells us 
more than just how the matter in the solar system will always move in “round here”, 
in “our world” (Stern, 14). The idea is that it would also tell us how material bodies 
would move differently in other possible worlds, such as those in which the Sun has 
10% more mass. One could raise other issues concerning the precise further modal 
extent, but this will depend on details I have not tried to clear up in Hegel. 
In any case, the first premise is more important. When I say that Hegel 
defends the possibility of the natural sciences having knowledge of immanent 
concepts in terms of something like inference to the best explanation, I do not mean 
to say thereby that Hegel sees this as much of a description of his method in the 
Logic. Hegel’s topic, on my account, is indeed continuous with natural science. 
Hegel’s view is systematically unified: all theoretical inquiry concerns the why of 
things, or reason in the world. But I see Hegel as showing that the natural sciences 
raise questions about this, while yet being unable to answer these further 
questions—such as the question of what laws of nature are. In general, Hegel 
pursues metaphysics in a sense that is… 
…more precisely distinguished by the generality and directness with 
which its questions address the topic of reason in the world. (pp. 3-4) 
As the generality increases, this forces a development in the appropriate methods. 
So the Hegelian arguments covered in the book are not cases of inferring from 
observations. For example: Consider the kind of mechanist philosophy that would 
reject Hegel’s immanent concepts, on grounds that the explanatory role of such 
things would be rendered superfluous by the admissibility of mechanistic explanation 
everywhere. But Hegel argues (on my account) that this absolute mechanism is 
incoherent, because even mechanism itself would require such immanent concepts to 
play an explanatory role. In a sense, the modal ambition is maximum: in absolutely 
no possible world could it be the case that mechanism could leave no explanatory 
role for any immanent concepts. And in such arguments there need be no inference 
from observations of the actual world; the workings of natural science make the 
philosophical problems determinate for us (EL §12Anm), but are not needed to 
resolve them. Note that saying this about independence from empirical observation 
is not to give up my denial that metaphysics can be distinguished by a final end 
definable in epistemological terms, as a pursuit of a priori knowledge. The final end 
or point is insight into the why of things; this turns out to require, as means, a 
method that is in some senses independent of experience.   
But I think that Stern’s focus is on the more difficult question of whether 
there must necessarily be complete explicability, or be some form of “the idea”. On 
my view, this question should be considered in light of an overall sense of Hegel’s 
method in the Logic (2015, Ch. 10). What drives this method is Hegel’s borrowing 
Kant’s claim that all theoretical inquiry seeks forms of complete reasons, or what 
Kant calls “the unconditioned”. Hegel argues, as I discuss below, that Kant’s case 
from here specifically for a limitation of reason does not work. So Hegel takes 
philosophical inquiry, when running up against contradictions generated by a lack of 
completeness on a given domain, to be justified in concluding that there must 
necessarily be something more complete, proceeding by a process of determinate 
negation to a better candidate account of complete reason in the world, and so on 
until completeness is reached. The resulting “must necessarily”, I argue, is 
epistemic: what is demonstrated is that no possible form of theoretical inquiry could 
adequately support any competing conclusion. For example, no possible form of 
theoretical inquiry could demonstrate the non-existence of “the idea” or 
completeness of reason in the world, for it would in so doing already demonstrate 
the hopelessness of all theoretical inquiry.   
Perhaps there is a sense in which the conclusion here would cover less than 
“all possible worlds” (Stern, 15): perhaps it would be better to say that the results in 
question apply to any possible explicable or intelligible world. But, first, a lack of 
absolute modal extent need not be a failure to carry Hegel’s metaphysical project 
absolutely through; for—again—the final aim is insight into the why of things, not 
modal extent, and there is room for argument about what the appropriate modal 
extent is relative to that distinct final aim. Second, I think Stern’s proposal would in 
any case reach parallel results on this score. For example,  
…why are there objects with properties (for example)? ... because 
otherwise there could not be anything at all, as this is the only stable 
form for being to take. (15) 
This kind of argument seems to me like it would show that any possible stable world 
would be so structured (in whatever sense of “stable” makes the argument go). And, 
at the end of the day, Stern sees an argument from Kant’s problem about the ground 
of agreement of representations and objects; but then the conclusions should be 
about any possible knowable or representable world, parallel to the conclusions I 
attribute to Hegel concerning any possibly intelligible or explicable world. With 
respect to modal ambition, I think this is a wash. I prefer my version because I think 
it does do better justice to the sense in which Hegel is arguing, in Kantian terms, for 
a priority of reason (issues about explicability and completeness) over the 
understanding (issues about the relation between representations and objects in 
general).  
Finally, Stern worries that my Hegel might be limited to holding a “special 
metaphysics” without a “general metaphysics”. But I agree with Stern that  
the focus on explanation which Kreines emphasizes actually dovetails 
naturally with the ontological project of metaphysica generalis (15) 
In this vein, I argued that Hegel is harnessing the issues about the metaphysics of 
reason in order to justify a reconception of the notion of substance itself, and even 
the conclusion that everything real is at least a distant approximation of reason in 
the world. What separates Stern and I here, in my view, is rather this: on my 
account Hegel rests his descendent of general metaphysics squarely on problems 
about the completeness of reason, and this prevents getting off the train and 
dispelling further problems, or modestly refraining from any special metaphysics.3 I 
think that the overall argument is so unified that every step is wired into Hegel’s 
systematic project, for which success would require an account of the priority of 
specifically complete forms of reason, or “the idea”, over incomplete forms—would 
require a descendent of special metaphysics. So I would think that Stern’s worry 
would be that my Hegel is too metaphysically ambitious, rather than the reverse. But 
I think that these ambitions are Hegel’s, and that their systematic unity gives them 
overlooked philosophical strengths.  
                                          
3  Cf. Stern 2009, 32. 
Knappik and Many Monisms  
Given the above, it should be clear that Hegel (on my view) is committed to 
following absolutely through the problem of the completeness of reasons. But he also 
argues that such completeness looks very different than we expect. It will, Hegel 
argues, not look like any metaphysical foundationalism, according to which there is 
something on which everything depends, providing a complete reason for everything. 
So it cannot be, more specifically, any monist form of metaphysical foundationalism 
(everything is in the One substance, which provides a complete reason for 
everything). Nor any scientific foundationalism, and so on. This is part of the 
meaning, I argue, of Hegel’s slogan—repeated in many forms and sometimes 
deployed against Spinoza—that “the absolute cannot be a first, an immediate. 
Essentially the absolute is rather its result.”4 I will here work in four steps toward  
Knappik’s central worry about my denial that Hegel is a metaphysical monist, and a 
compelling proposal he makes in response. I will maintain my position: the Logic 
defends conclusions that are ambitiously metaphysical, and also involve a form of 
monism—but the ambitious metaphysics is non-monist, and the monism is 
epistemological.  
First, the metaphysics of the understanding (MU): The completion of Hegel’s 
Logic argument is rooted, I argue, in his case that philosophers have confused two 
incompatible demands: the demand of the understanding (requiring something to 
correspond absolutely with the subject of a subject-predicate judgment) and the 
demand of reason (for completeness specifically of explainers or reasons in the 
world). The former encourages us to think not of reasons but of various substrata—
paradigmatically but not exclusively the famous bare substratum. But substrata 
would then be of no explanatory relevance to whatever led us to posit them, and so 
no form of reason in the world. For example, in the paradigm case, the entirely bare 
substratum would be too bare to explain anything at all. The posit of substrata rests, 
in the end, not on any real need to explain, but only on the assumption that reality 
corresponds to the form of subject-predicate judgment. Hegel rejects this 
assumption, arguing that we must reject it in order to succeed in following through 
absolutely on completeness specifically of reasons.  
 Knappik agrees that MU has something to do with substrata, but argues—
looking the introductory material in the Encyclopedia—that Hegel rather treats 
                                          
4 WL 6:196/473 
quite another assumption as the central error of MU: namely, the 
assumption that thought-determinations such as reality and negation 
are ‘absolute opposites’… its atomism. (12) 
I separate my claims about this into two: (i) Anti-atomism cannot be central in the 
sense that it is the ultimate support for the argument. For Hegel sees this anti-
atomism as part of what is at issue and not accepted by his opponents. I think it is 
more traditional to focus on anti-atomism, but that leaving the matter resting there 
would mean that Hegel, on his own account, would be merely assuming what is at 
stake, depriving any following argument of philosophical force, or obviously begging 
the question. (Perhaps some contemporary readers do not worry here, because they 
like arguments from linguistic-turn philosophy for holism about meaning; but the 
issue that arises in Hegel concerns metaphysical holism—and he is, again, precisely 
not transforming metaphysical issues by taking issues about meaning as more 
fundamental, but transforming everything else in light of his metaphysical focus.) 
Further, (ii), I give an account of the needed supporting argument: it rests on the 
metaphysics of reason, and more specifically the tension between the demand of 
reason for explainers and the demand of the understanding for substrata. By resting 
here, Hegel draws on Kant’s own commitments—about the faculty of reason—in 
arguing against Kant. With respect to anti-atomism specifically, I focus on the 
example of lawful interaction in the “Chemism” section of the Logic (2015, Ch. 7). In 
effect, Hegel shows that even positing properties as atomistically independent would 
be a way of positing a substratum. We might posit such properties for the lawfully 
interacting, but they could be no reason for lawful interactions, and so are just as 
objectionable as other cases of substrata, above. The point is, then, that the attack 
on substrata supports everything else, including the anti-atomism, and thus anything 
that follows from the latter. So I don’t see how my account could be blocked from 
grounding anything that an approach via anti-atomism grounds; my account supplies 
the prior argument needed if any of it is to be grounded at all.5  
Much is supposed to follow. For example, it is supposed to follow that reason 
is the key concept of metaphysics, and (in a line Knappik cites) “we should not 
understand reason in terms of dependence” (2015, 230). Think of this in terms of 
the idea of a metaphysical side of the notion of explanation. We cannot, then, 
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“processes” in the body of the Logic. Since it makes no suggestions about how we should or should not 
explain the philosophical issues driving these “processes”, he seems to here accept my (i) and offer no 
challenge to my (ii).  
account for explanation itself in terms that are entirely contextual and/or entirely 
epistemic (e.g. as prediction, or as a form of argument). Even those granting that 
there is a such metaphysical side of explanation might have wanted to understand it 
as dependence, meaning that appeal to X in explaining Y would be possible only if 
there is some worldly sense in which Y depends on X (cf. Kim 1994, 67). But 
dependence is too permissive, insofar as it would include dependence on a substrate, 
which would turn out indifferent, or not of explanatory relevance. We need first of 
all, then, a positive conception, from the perspective (as it were) of the explanans 
rather than explanandum. The key concept, then, is rather reason in the world. One 
way to put it is this: appeal to X in explaining Y is possible only if (along with any 
other constraints, which may be epistemological, contextual, etc.) X is reason in the 
world for Y.  
So I do not accept either option offered by Knappik on this topic (16): The 
point is not to deny that reasons may involve any form of dependence. Reasons 
might, looked at backwards, involve some sorts of dependence. For example, with 
respect to the rotation of the planets, the immanent concept or kind—the Begriff of 
matter—is the reason for the rotation of the planets; the rotation depends, in this 
sense, on the concept. But the notion of reason must be primary in order to exclude 
bad generalizations to other, ill-fitting forms of dependence, like dependence on a 
substrate.  
Similarly, the point is also not that complete reasons involve no form of 
dependence (16); whatever is explained by a complete reason would be dependent 
(in an explanatory sense) on that complete reason. But this completeness cannot be 
understood until we carefully block bad generalizations to other, ill-fitting forms of 
dependence—else we run into contradictions involved in combining a notion of a 
complete substrate with that of an explainer. So reasons can be complete, even if 
they are also in some senses dependent, as long as they are only dependent in 
senses irrelevant to explanatory import. Hegel argues that life is an example: life 
depends on there being some or other form of lawful reality, as a kind of substratum 
indifferent to what life does; but this form of dependence is no form of reason, and 
so does not detract from the greater explanatory completeness of life as compared 
to the lawful. Similarly, the absolutely complete reason can be a result—something in 
some senses dependent on something else (as an end is dependent on a beginning).  
I express this point also in terms of Kant’s notion of “the unconditioned”:  
we could take the term … either to (i) essentially refer to the 
completeness of reasons, or to (ii) essentially encompass both 
completeness of reasons and finality of substrata. (2015, 204) 
Where Hegel sees the latter sense in Kant, he rejects the very notion of the 
unconditioned as confused and misleading (e.g. EL §45). But, crucially, in the former 
sense, Hegel is defending an account of the reality of the unconditioned as “the idea” 
(WL 4:463/671). The same applies to my metaphor of a turtle-with-a-jetpack, as an 
alternative to last-turtle or only-infinite-turtles: if understood as referring essentially 
to rationalist conceptions that confuse reason and dependence, Hegel rejects the 
very notion; but if referring properly to the idea of something that is a complete 
reason for itself and all that follows from itself, then Hegel is defending a turtle-with-
a-jetpack. There is such a turtle with a jetpack, even if it is (as it were) also 
dependent, in a non-explanatory sense, on many turtles that compose it. 
I would say something similar about Knappik’s worry that my Hegel would be 
forced to simply choose the Antithesis side in Kant’s antinomies. On my account, 
Hegel does indeed reject Thesis-style arguments: they all confuse substrata with 
reasons. But, on my account, Hegel also rejects Antithesis-style arguments: he does 
so because they preclude completeness of reason. For example, with regard to an 
Antithesis style argument that would make absolute the lawful interaction of 
“Chemism”: this would deny any complete “form of reason”, which is why the Logic 
“must turn instead to teleology” (2015, 192). Hegel’s central problem, on my 
account, is how to conceive and find the completeness blocked by such Antithesis 
reasoning, without falling back on the Thesis way of appealing to substrata.6  
Second, Hegel’s argument against metaphysical foundationalism. Knappik 
agrees with me that Hegel rejects the principle of sufficient reason (PSR); Hegel 
allows that some things lack complete explanations (Knappik, 18). Given my 
definition of foundationalism as involving one foundational complete explanation for 
everything, this means agreeing that Hegel is no foundationalist. Still, Knappik 
worries that I haven’t found in Hegel a sufficient argument, from consideration of 
explanations or reasons to anti-foundationalism.  
As I see it, part of the story here is how prominent foundationalist proposals 
fail. Crucial for Hegel is his argument that Spinoza’s monism fails: substance 
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becomes an indifferent substratum, forcing elimination of difference and finitude 
rather than its explanation or grounding—a conclusion Hegel finds unacceptable.7 
Knappik protests that Spinoza has and needs no indifferent substratum:   
substance explains the modes that inhere in it precisely in virtue of its 
determinate characteristics, namely, in virtue of its essence. (6) 
But I don’t see any help here against the argument from Hegel I emphasize: Spinoza 
tries to make sense of real difference within one substance, in part, by holding that 
different attributes, like thought and extension, are such that there can be no 
explanatory relation between them. Further, Knappik is appealing to essence, which 
Spinoza connects to the attributes, defined as “what the intellect perceives of a 
substance, as constituting its essence” (EID4). Knappik’s proposal will thus threaten 
to leave Spinoza with different attributes as distinct and independent basic 
explanatory grounds of things, with no sense of the unity of a monism. Hegel’s 
thought, as I understand it, is that Spinoza retains the unity only by employing the 
model of substance as a substrate of the attributes. But then substance must be 
indifferent to anything specific to the attribute of thought, for example, so that the 
lack of explanatory connections between distinct attributes would not prevent 
substance from also equally grounding the attribute of extension. And then 
substance seems too indifferent to the difference in attributes to ground them, and 
through them either infinite or finite modes; as Hegel puts it: 
…the determinations are not developed from substance, it does not 
resolve itself into these attributes. (VGP 20:173/3:264) 
If everything real needs a complete reason in substance, and difference and finitude 
could have none, then Spinoza should be forced to eliminate it.  
I know, of course, that it is traditional to think that Hegel claims to retain all 
of this monist foundationalism but to solve the problem by altering the conception of 
the foundation. So it is crucial that I see in the Logic a general argument against any 
foundationalism. Knappik is right that this argument runs via a claim we can call 
realizer-required:  
  …the various forms of Hegel’s idea – and thus, the privileged forms of 
reasons in the world – are kind-dependent processes which essentially 
take place in something else, in a realizer which is not itself an instance 
of the kind that governs the process.  I entirely agree that Hegel holds 
this view. (16) 
                                          
7 “Spinozism is a deficient philosophy” (WL 6:195/472) for this reason. 
Having agreed with the interpretation on this point, Knappik asks why this should 
rule out foundationalism. The most direct answer would bring back into view Hegel’s 
argument for this claim, at the crucial transition in the Logic to “The Idea”: The 
“Chemism” chapter shows that non-teleological or lawfully related objects necessarily 
lack explanatory completeness; so completeness, or “the idea”, requires teleology. 
The “Teleology” chapter shows that explanatorily complete teleology requires inner 
purposiveness; but it also requires realization in or “mediation” by something non-
teleological/lawful, because if something teleological interacted directly by nature or 
immediately with the lawful then it would and lack explanatory completeness: 
In an immediate connection … purpose would itself enter into the sphere 
of mechanism and chemism and would therefore be subject to 
accidentality and to the loss of its determining vocation. (WL 
6:452/663) 
It is easy to see why this argument would rule out foundationalism: completeness of 
explanation requires realization in something else, specifically because it requires 
realization in something not explanatorily complete; this rules out the possibility that 
everything has a complete reason, and so rules out foundationalism (in the sense 
above).  
Three, there are of course texts in Hegel that seem at first to suggest 
foundationalism, specifically in a metaphysically monist form. But I also point out 
that other texts equally appear, at least at first, to cut against foundationalism in 
general. Some examples are isolated by these lines in the book:  
(a) Passages difficult for Spinozist interpretations include those 
concerning the weakness and contingency as limits of the 
explicability of nature, for example… 
(b) Passages difficult for my non-Spinozist approach will include Hegel’s 
claims that the idea is all substance, truth, actuality. (2015, 261-2) 
The passages Knappik cites as apparently expressing metaphysical monism seem to 
me also to belong under heading (a). So, given the tension here, I think that 
interpreters on all sides need explanations—myself included. The strongest 
metaphysical monist readings known to me do provide an explanation: they argue 
that passages like those in (a) are not rejections of foundationalist monism but are 
just specifications of how some things look when judged from a merely partial 
perspective; while the passages in (b) say that, from a complete perspective, 
foundationalist monism is true.8 
But I think that foundationalist metaphysical monism—although certainly 
philosophically interesting in itself—does not fit Hegel’s commitments. First, there is 
the anti-foundationalist argument above: a real complete form of reason would 
require realization in an incomplete form of reason; the argument is metaphysical, 
and requires more than just something taken to be incomplete when judged from a 
partial perspective. Other tensions stem from the fact that no one, to my 
knowledge—including Hegel—has provided an absolutely complete explanation for 
everything about anything like this or that bit of matter. To be sure, some 
foundationalists might have promising responses. They might respond by saying that 
only a divine, immediate grasp of reality would reveal the complete explanation for 
such things. But Hegel, starting long before the Logic, begins to bitterly criticize 
those of his contemporaries who he portrays as defending metaphysical monism by 
appeal to a dualism of mediate and immediate intellect (e.g. WL 5:65/46–47 and 
PhG §27/16); right or wrong about others, this precludes Hegel from making the 
rejected move himself.9 Finally, some foundationalists might respond instead by 
ceding that bits of matter have no complete explanation, and so (given 
foundationalism) cannot exist. But this is a form of the eliminativist move to which 
Hegel says that Spinoza is, unacceptably, forced. Overall, foundationalist 
metaphysical monism does not fit Hegel’s philosophical commitments well.  
And there is a better way; I say this instead: there is ambitious metaphysics 
in passages under heading (b), but it is not monist; and there is monism there, but it 
is not metaphysical.  
With respect to metaphysics, then, consider the proposal that all “actuality” is 
“the idea”: that certainly seems to be metaphysical monism. But Hegel’s use of the 
term “actuality” clearly means to deny that everything there is “truly merits the 
name 'actuality'”.10 So any connection between actuality and the idea should cut 
against metaphysical monism (on which everything there is would be “the idea”). 
Similarly, all “substance” may be “the idea”, but I show that Hegel’s metaphysics 
                                          
8 A strong example:  Franks’ explanation of German Idealism more generally in terms of “a partial 
perspective located within the whole” as opposed to “the perspective from which alone the whole can be 
seen as a totality, with an absolute first principle” (2005, 334). 
9  I take no stand here or in the book on whether matters might be different on this score in 
Hegel’s very earliest writings. 
10 EL §6Anm; Kreines 2015, 238. 
recognizes that some of what there is—for example, the lawful—is real but 
insubstantial. There might then be only “one substantial being”, as Knappik quotes 
Hegel, but that is itself no expression of metaphysical monism.   
Further, I recognize a monism in some of these passages, but an 
epistemological sort. In short, Hegel’s way of taking metaphysics as fundamental 
raises transformed epistemological problems—no longer at base problems about 
knowledge or intentionality, but problems about the epistemological side of the 
notion of explanation, or about our grasp of or understanding of reason in the world. 
And Hegel argues for a monism here: anything being such that we can find it 
intelligible depends on its relation to the absolute idea, in one all-encompassing 
epistemological system. Note how this relates to Hegel’s claims, in passages noted 
above and by Knappik, that “the idea” (and in some sense at least a one rather than 
a many) is the “truth” of everything. But Hegel clearly uses the term “truth” in an 
unusual manner: it is not “correctness” (Richtigkeit), or an agreement of 
representation with object; it is an agreement between an object and a standard set 
by its own immanent purpose. Since not everything is a form of “the idea”, there are 
some things that have no inner purpose, and aren’t even candidates for truth in 
themselves. Hegel’s method aims to show that any theoretical consideration of these 
things, if pursued completely, should lead to antinomy contradictions, resolved by 
something else –  in this epistemological sense the latter is “the truth of” the former. 
Ultimately, the process leads to “the idea”, which is accordingly “the truth of” 
everything else—in this epistemological sense; it is the result of philosophy.   
This reading resolves the problems with foundationalist readings: Passages 
like (a) seem to be anti-foundationalist metaphysical assertions that some things 
lack a complete reason, because that is precisely Hegel’s view. There is no problem 
about a failure to complete explain things like bits of matter; Hegel’s view is that 
such things do lack complete reasons—so much the worse, when it comes to 
metaphysical status, for bits of matter! And yet this account recognizes, in passages 
like (b), a sense in which Hegel pursues an ambitious metaphysics of complete 
reasons, and also a connected kind of monism (an epistemological kind).  
Note that my reasoning here has nothing to do with a desire to find in Hegel 
conclusions that are more commonsensical than monism, or that seem true by the 
standards of contemporary philosophical orthodoxy. I don’t think that Hegel’s actual 
conclusions are either of these. And this is all to the good, on my view, because I am 
more interested in how Hegel—and Kant, and other historical figures—provide strong 
arguments against common sense and contemporary philosophical orthodoxy. So 
what moves me away from a metaphysical foundationalist reading is that I don’t 
think it can do as well at understanding Hegel’s conclusions in light of the arguments 
he gives for them, and the commitments from which he actually argues, and how the 
whole fits together into a philosophical system.    
Four, Knappik’s other monism: I have focused on arguing against readings 
attributing to Hegel foundationalist metaphysical monism. And this is the way I have 
dealt with the sort of passages Knappik emphasizes. Why have I focused in this way? 
Well, take all the existing interpretations claiming to find in Hegel arguments for 
metaphysical monism; they find arguments that seem to me to hope to support, if 
anything, foundationalist monism. That is, the arguments aim to exclude non-monist 
forms of metaphysics on grounds that only a metaphysical monism could provide a 
complete reason for everything real. Some may portray Hegel as running into a 
problem about the consistency with the premise of that form of argument with his 
other claims, like those in (a) concerning contingency.11 And some may see Hegel as 
ambivalent. For example, Inwood—one of Knappik’s examples—portrays Hegel as 
“believing, or at least half-believing, that everything had to be just as it is and that it 
could be shown why it is so” (1983, 64). But if such beliefs drive the arguments, 
then this seems to me a picture of Hegel’s philosophy as ambivalently advocating 
foundationalist metaphysical monism—not a picture of it as advocating something 
else. Knappik, by contrast, seems to me to propose something very different: Hegel 
is out to defend a coherent form of metaphysical monism that includes the claim that 
some things lack complete reasons—to defend non-foundationalist metaphysical 
monism (in my terms). Everything real would be in the One; and the One would 
completely explain some things, but not everything, leaving some facts brute.  
This seems to me a wonderful idea, and I certainly encourage the increased 
attention it will likely receive. Still, I will for now stick with my position, and for this 
main reason: I still don’t see how one could read Hegel as hoping to argue for this 
non-foundationalist metaphysical monism; as soon as one locates the sort of 
arguments needed, one seems destined to portray Hegel as a foundationalist (if 
perhaps also ambivalent). Knappik sees Hegel’s hopes as resting with an ontological 
argument for the existence of God. And Knappik is right that it was not enough for 
                                          
11 See e.g. Beiser’s (2005, 76ff.) powerful demonstration that traditional appeals to a necessity of 
contingency do not solve the problem of consistency of contingency with foundationalist metaphysical 
monism. Beiser sees this as a problem for Hegel; I see it as a problem for traditional interpretations.  
me to say that ontological argument would have to support something so powerful 
that it would explain everything; Knappik is right that my own book suggests a very 
different possibility:  
Hegel can be plausibly read as holding the view that the realization of 
the absolute idea necessarily has to involve contingent and therefore 
brute facts (precisely because it requires an indifferent realizer, as 
Kreines had argued). (18) 
This is a wonderful idea, and I cannot help but be attracted to it; what I said about 
this was indeed not enough. Still, this doesn’t really dislodge my same main reason 
for pessimism, from above: I still see no hope here for supporting metaphysical 
monism in particular. To be sure, if some rationalist thinks that an ontological 
argument establishes the existence of something that completely explains 
everything, then I see that she might hope to then argue that nothing could play this 
role unless metaphysical monism is true. But Knappik and I agree that Hegel rejects 
the idea that everything has a complete explanation. Maybe—I now cede –a modified 
ontological argument might support the existence of a complete explainer that 
complete explains itself but not everything. But could Hegel hope to argue that 
nothing could conceivably play that role unless metaphysical monism is true? No. 
Consider, for example, one of several reasons, stemming from the principle to which 
Knappik agrees: realizer-required, which holds that forms of “the idea” are  
kind-dependent processes which essentially take place in something 
else, in a realizer which is not itself an instance of the kind that governs 
the process. (16) 
So the kind or concept involved in a form of “the idea”—presumably a complete 
explainer—is not the kind or concept of the realizer; for all that has been said, this 
leaves at least two, not the One. Knappik thinks that I’ve overlooked some 
possibilities here: First, there might be a purpose that produces the conditions of its 
own realization; second, higher-level kinds or concepts might partially determine a 
lower-level. But, what results if we could add all this to realizer-required? (I am 
worried that a strong enough form to give monism would conflict with the teleology 
argument above; but set that aside.) If they could be combined, this would result in 
a metaphysics that is, for all said so far, non-monist: one ultimate ground produces 
something distinct from itself, something not an instance of the same one kind or 
concept. And I don’t need any requirement here: if a complete reason in a non-
monist metaphysics is even conceivable, then there still seems no hope for any route 
from a modified ontological argument to metaphysical monism in particular.12  
I should note that I reach these conclusions on the basis, in part, of my 
interpretive emphasis on Hegel’s arguments and their organization into a system. I 
focus in this way, on argument and system, because I think this is part of our only 
hope for the study of philosophers like Hegel to avoid anachronism, and instead to 
bring our own contemporary prejudices to light, and to place them in question—
including our prejudices about what philosophy itself is. Still, some might think that 
giving different weights to different interpretive principles might help Knappik’s 
proposal about non-foundationalist metaphysical monism. But consider what Knappik 
says about this: we should take seemingly monist passages at “face value” (p. 3) 
unless given sufficient reasons against; he thinks that I have attractive but not 
sufficient reasons against. But then what is the “face value” of these passages? To 
judge by Knappik’s own examples of monist interpretations (and my own sense) the 
“face value” is again foundationalist metaphysical monism, on which everything has 
a complete explanation. So giving more weight to face value than I do—downplaying 
philosophical concerns about argument and system—seems to me no panacea for 
Knappik’s proposal. Similarly, some may think that we should read Hegel in light of 
views most popular with other philosophers of his time and place. I avoid this, 
because I think that similar claims on the surface can mislead us about very different 
systematic projects and arguments—because I think this method unjustly privileges 
identity over difference. But, in any case, I think that interpretations which more 
heavily stress this kind of continuity end up seeing in Hegel, again, foundationalist 
metaphysical monism.13 So, again, I don’t see this emphasis as resolving the 
difficulty for Knappik’s proposal.     
In sum—while I save room for future debate about the extremely compelling 
counter-proposals in both Knappik and Stern—I am content to rest the final matter, 
for now, in this way: Knappik and I agree that there are reasons in favor of reading 
Hegel as denying that everything is completely explicable, or as rejecting the PSR. 
We agree that these reasons are sufficient to that end. I simply add that the same 
reasons (as I see it) should still be judged equally sufficient when they point us also 
                                          
12 Granted, if you draw a line, is it were, around the realizer, you might also have a line 
encompassing the realized, and you could say that the One is simply the whole of everything within the 
line; but almost any metaphysics would allow such a line, so this is not enough for metaphysical monism 
in any non‐trivial sense. 
13 See for example Beiser (2005) and Franks (2005).  
toward the conclusion that the doctrine of Hegel’s Logic is both monist and 
ambitiously metaphysical, but no form of metaphysical monism at all.i  
end 
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